The Supreme Court Law
Review: Osgoode’s Annual
Constitutional Cases
Conference
Volume 34 (2006)

Article 16

Treaty Interpretation After R. v. Marshall; R. v.
Bernard
Mahmud Jamal

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works
4.0 License.
Citation Information
Jamal, Mahmud. "Treaty Interpretation After R. v. Marshall; R. v. Bernard." The Supreme Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual
Constitutional Cases Conference 34. (2006).
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr/vol34/iss1/16

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Supreme
Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.

Treaty Interpretation After R. v.
Marshall; R. v. Bernard
Mahmud Jamal∗

I. INTRODUCTION
R. v. Marshall; R. v. Bernard1 is no doubt one of the most important
rulings on Aboriginal title and treaty rights to be released by the
Supreme Court of Canada for some time. The decision contains much to
ponder about both the nature of Aboriginal title and how to interpret
historical treaties. This paper focuses on the treaty issues in Marshall;
Bernard, against the backdrop of the Court’s earlier rulings in Marshall
1 and Marshall 2, and seeks to identify some issues and implications for
treaty litigation arising out of the Court’s ruling.

II. MARSHALL; BERNARD ON TREATY RIGHTS
1. The “Peace and Friendship” Treaties of 1760 and 1761
Marshall; Bernard is the third case in a trilogy of Supreme Court
decisions dealing with the trade clause in the Mi’kmaq “Peace and
Friendship” treaties. These treaties were concluded in 1760 and 1761
between the British and the Mi’kmaq peoples of the former colony of
Nova Scotia, now the Provinces of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick.
Briefly, the background to these treaties was that the British had
succeeded in driving the French from Nova Scotia and wanted peace
with their former enemies, the Mi’kmaq, who had been allies and
trading partners with the French for almost 250 years. To secure peace,
the British agreed under the treaties to set up trading posts or
∗

Of the Ontario Bar. Partner, Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt LLP, Toronto. I acted as counsel
for the New Brunswick Forest Products Association, an intervener in R. v. Marshall; R. v. Bernard
and R. v. Sappier and Polchies and R. v. Gray. I would like to thank Neil Paris for his helpful
comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
1
[2005] S.C.J. No. 44, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 220 [hereinafter “Marshall; Bernard”].
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“truckhouses” to allow the Mi’kmaq to continue their traditional trade
formerly conducted with the French, but the Mi’kmaq were now
required to trade exclusively with the British at the truckhouses. The
pact was mutually beneficial in that the British acquired peace with the
Mi’kmaq, while the Mi’kmaq preserved their access to European
goods.2
The operative trade clause in the treaty expresses a straightforward
negative covenant of the Mi’kmaq Chiefs not to trade except with the
British at the truckhouses. It reads:
And I do further engage that we will not traffick, barter or Exchange any
Commodities in any manner but with such persons or the managers of such
Truck houses as shall be appointed or Established by His Majesty’s
Governor....3

However, the interpretation of this clause has proved anything but
straightforward. This brief but mischievous trade clause has now been
the subject of three significant rulings from the Supreme Court of
Canada. These rulings are reviewed below, as the background for a
discussion of the treaty aspects of the Marshall; Bernard decision.
2. Marshall 1
The first case in the trilogy is the Supreme Court’s 1999 ruling in R. v.
Marshall, known as “Marshall 1”.4 In Marshall 1, the Court had to
decide whether the trade clause protected the right of the Mi’kmaq
peoples to engage in commercial fishing (or fishing for trade) contrary
to federal fishing regulations. In a 5-2 decision, Binnie J. for a majority
of the Court held that the Mi’kmaq had such a treaty right to “fish for
trade”. Justice Binnie found that the treaty affirmed “the right of the
Mi’kmaq people to continue to provide for their own sustenance by
taking the products of their hunting, fishing and other gathering
activities and trading for what in 1760 was termed ‘necessaries’”.5

2

Id., at paras. 7-8, per McLachlin C.J.
Id., at para. 8.
4
[1999] S.C.J. No. 55, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456 [hereinafter “Marshall 1”]. Justice Binnie
wrote reasons for the majority, agreed to by Lamer C.J., L’Heureux-Dubé, Cory and Iacobucci JJ.
The dissenting reasons were authored by McLachlin J. (as she then was), and were agreed to by
Gonthier J.
5
Id., at para. 4.
3
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Justice Binnie frankly accepted that this conclusion did not flow
from the words of the written treaty itself. As he put it: “It seems clear
that the words of the March 10, 1760 document, standing in isolation,
do not support” the existence of such a treaty right. However, in his
view this was not the end of the analysis: “[t]he question is whether the
underlying negotiations produced a broader agreement between the
British and the Mi’kmaq, memorialized only in part in the Treaty of
Peace and Friendship”.6 Justice Binnie found such a broader agreement
through an elaborate analysis of the wording of the treaty and extrinsic
historical sources, including the historical and cultural context, earlier
Mi’kmaq treaties with the British, the minutes of the negotiating
sessions between the British and the Maliseet (who concluded a similar
treaty with the British), and the expert evidence tendered at trial. Based
on this review, he concluded that the treaty was “partly oral and partly
written”.7
Justice Binnie stated that such a broader approach was justified
because the Court had long since rejected a strict or technical approach
to treaty interpretation. He nevertheless warned that “[g]enerous rules of
interpretation should not be confused with a vague sense of after-thefact largesse”. As he explained, “the bottom line is the Court’s
obligation is to ‘choose from among the various possible interpretations
of the common intention [at the time the treaty was made] the one which
best reconciles’ the Mi’kmaq interests and those of the British Crown.”8
Justice Binnie acknowledged that while the right to fish was not
mentioned either in the text of the treaty, or in the underlying
negotiations, he was prepared to imply such a term, noting by analogy to
the law of contract that “[c]ourts will imply a contractual term on the
basis of the presumed intentions of the parties which is necessary to
assure the efficacy of the contract”. In his view, such a presumed
intention could be derived by applying the “officious bystander test”
from contract law, a well known judicial construct for implying
contractual terms that reflect the unexpressed will of the contracting
parties to fill gaps that they have left.9 Justice Binnie concluded that,
having regard to the honour of the Crown, an officious bystander would
have inferred that the Mi’kmaq were assured continuing access to
6
7
8
9

Id., at para. 7.
Id., at para. 51.
Id., at para. 14 (Binnie J.’s emphasis).
Id., at para. 43.
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resources in order to engage in traditional trading activities. In his view,
to simply read the Mi’kmaq’s positive trade demand into a negative
Mi’kmaq covenant would not be consistent with the honour and
integrity of the Crown.10 Justice Binnie thus held that “the surviving
substance of the treaty is not the literal promise of a truckhouse, but a
treaty right to continue to obtain necessaries through hunting and fishing
by trading the products of those traditional activities subject to
restrictions that can be justified under the Badger test”.11
In dissent, McLachlin J. (as she then was) took a narrower view of
what the treaty protected. She concluded that the treaty “created an
exclusive trade and truckhouse regime which implicitly gave rise to a
limited Mi’kmaq right to bring goods to British trade outlets so long as
this regime was extant”. The treaty granted no “freestanding” right to
truckhouses or to trade outside of the truckhouse regime: “[t]he system
of trade exclusivity and correlative British trading outlets died out in the
1780s and with it, the incidental right to bring goods to trade.”12
Justice McLachlin was evidently concerned that the majority’s
conclusion created “an unintended right of broad and undefined
scope”.13 She warned presciently of the dangers of the majority’s
expansive approach, foreshadowing the Court’s need to clarify Marshall
1 in Marshall 2 and to then further explain those reasons again in
Marshall; Bernard. The majority’s approach, she noted, rendered the
treaty rights “inchoate” and made it impossible for the Crown to justify
limitations on such treaty rights. This would function to create
illegitimately an unintended right of broad and undefined scope. Instead,
in McLachlin J.’s view the correct approach is to begin by defining the
core of the treaty right and to seek its modern counterpart. This allows a
court to assess whether the law in question derogates from that right and
to address any justifications for such derogation in a meaningful way.14
While McLachlin J.’s reasons on the interpretation of the treaty did
not command a majority of the Court, her discussion will continue to be
relevant for distilling the canons of treaty interpretation established by
earlier cases. She set out the following guiding principles:

10
11
12
13
14

Id., at para. 52.
Id., at para. 56.
Id., at para. 70.
Id., at para. 102.
Id., at paras. 109-112.
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This Court has set out the principles governing treaty interpretation on
many occasions. They include the following.
1

Aboriginal treaties constitute a unique type of agreement and
attract special principles of interpretation […]

2

Treaties should be liberally construed and ambiguities or doubtful
expressions should be resolved in favour of the aboriginal
signatories […]

3

The goal of treaty interpretation is to choose from among the
various possible interpretations of common intention the one
which best reconciles the interests of both parties at the time the
treaty was signed […]

4

In searching for the common intention of the parties, the integrity
and honour of the Crown is presumed […]

5

In determining the signatories’ respective understanding and
intentions, the court must be sensitive to the unique cultural and
linguistic differences between the parties […]

6

The words of the treaty must be given the sense which they would
naturally have held for the parties at the time […]

7

A technical or contractual interpretation of treaty wording should
be avoided […]

8

While construing the language generously, courts cannot alter the
terms of the treaty by exceeding what “is possible on the
language” or realistic […]

9

Treaty rights of aboriginal peoples must not be interpreted in a
static or rigid way. They are not frozen at the date of signature.
The interpreting court must update treaty rights to provide for
their modern exercise. This involves determining what modern
practices are reasonably incidental to the core treaty right in its
modern context […]15

3. Marshall 2
Exactly two months after releasing Marshall 1, the Court released
Marshall 2,16 ostensibly to dispose of a motion for a re-hearing brought

15
16

Id., at para. 78.
[1999] S.C.J. No. 66, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 533.
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by an intervener in Marshall 1. However, the Court’s now unanimous
decision goes much further than simply rejecting the re-hearing request,
taking the unusual step of elaborating extensively on the earlier majority
ruling.
The Court in Marshall 2 explained that Marshall 1 recognized the
Mi’kmaq’s treaty right to “work for a living through continuing access
to fish and wildlife to trade for ‘necessaries’, which a majority of the
Court interpreted as ‘food, clothing and housing, supplemented by a few
amenities’”.17 However, the Court emphasized that Marshall 1 did not
establish “a treaty right ‘to gather’ anything and everything physically
capable of being gathered. The issues were much narrower and the
ruling was much narrower”. The Court cautioned that the question of
whether the treaty protects trade in other natural resources, such as
logging, minerals or offshore natural gas deposits, would have to await
the presentation of proper historical evidence and argument in future
cases.18
4. Marshall; Bernard
Just over four years later, the Court had to decide the very issue it had
raised but refused to consider in Marshall 2 — whether the treaty
protected a right to engage in commercial logging. In Marshall;
Bernard, the Court had before it appeals from Nova Scotia and New
Brunswick in which various Mi’kmaq loggers had invoked the treaty in
defence to provincial prosecutions for logging on Crown lands without
authorization. The accused were all convicted at trial; and their initial
appeals to the summary conviction appeal courts were dismissed; but
their further appeals to the provincial courts of appeal were then
allowed. In Marshall, the convictions were set aside and new trials
ordered; while in Bernard, the conviction was set aside and an acquittal
entered.19 On further appeal, the Supreme Court allowed both appeals,
concluding that the treaty did not protect commercial logging.

17
18
19

Id., at para. 4.
Id., at paras. 19-20.
Supra, note 1, at para. 4, per McLachlin C.J.
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Although the seven justices who heard the case were unanimous in
the result, two sets of reasons were delivered.20 Chief Justice McLachlin
wrote for the majority of five justices; while LeBel J. wrote separate
reasons for two justices concurring in the result.21
In her majority reasons, McLachlin C.J. stated that Marshall 1 held
that “the treaties of 1760-61 conferred on the Mi’kmaq the right to catch
and sell fish for a moderate livelihood, on the ground that this activity
was the logical evolution of a trading practice that was within the
contemplation of the parties to the treaties”.22 The issue in Marshall;
Bernard was now the scope of this right, and in particular, whether it
extended to commercial logging.
Two contrasting interpretations were presented to the Court. The
first interpretation, presented by the Mi’kmaq respondents, focused on
the use of resources, and contended that if the resource in issue was
gathered or used by Mi’kmaq in an Aboriginal economy in 1760, in any
way or for any purpose, then it was protected by the treaty.23
The second interpretation, urged by the Crown, contended that the
treaty protected only those trading activities that were in the
contemplation of the parties at the time of the treaty. The emphasis was
thus not on what products were used, but on the contemplated trading
activities. Chief Justice McLachlin stated that the Crown “accepts
Marshall 1 and 2”, but argued that the truckhouse clause “merely
granted the Mi’kmaq the right to continue to trade in items traded in
1760-61. Only those trading activities were protected; other activities,
not within the contemplation of the British and Mi’kmaq of the day, are
not protected”. Chief Justice McLachlin noted that the Crown also
accepted that “ancestral trading activities are not frozen in time; the
treaty protects modern activities that can be said to be their logical
evolution”. However, the Crown argued that modern commercial
20

Justice Binnie recused himself from the hearing because before his appointment to the
bench he had been retained by the Attorney General of New Brunswick in connection with R. v.
Paul, [1998] N.B.J. No. 439, 153 D.L.R. (4th) 131 (C.A.), a case involving a claimed right of the
Mi’kmaq to harvest timber for trade in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia: see letter from S.C.C.
Registrar to parties and interveners dated December 17, 2004. As a result, McLachlin C.J. was the
only justice from Marshall 1 who sat on Marshall; Bernard. (Justice Major had been on the Court
during Marshall 1 and 2, but did not sit on either case; Major J. did however sit on Marshall;
Bernard).
21
Justices Major, Bastarache, Abella and Charron concurred with the Chief Justice’s
reasons, while Fish J. concurred with the reasons of LeBel J.
22
Id., at para. 13.
23
Id., at paras. 14-15.
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logging was not protected because it would transform the treaty right
into something new and different.24
Chief Justice McLachlin preferred the Crown’s interpretation. She
found that its argument was supported by the purpose of the truckhouse
clause and its wording, and by the historical record as interpreted in
Marshall 1 and 2.
Chief Justice McLachlin explained that the purpose of the clause
was to be a trade clause, concerned with what could be traded.25 It was
concerned “with traditionally traded products”. Chief Justice McLachlin
noted that while this right to trade in traditional products “carried with it
an implicit right to harvest those resources”, this was merely as “the
adjunct of the basic right to trade in traditional products. The right
conferred is not the right to harvest, in itself, but the right to trade”.26
Chief Justice McLachlin further noted that nothing in the wording
of the truckhouse clause conferred “a general right to harvest or gather
all natural resources then used”.27
Chief Justice McLachlin concluded that this view was also
consistent with the historical record as interpreted in Marshall 1 and 2,
which supported a limited treaty right to “trade in the products the
Mi’kmaq had traditionally traded with the Europeans”.28
Chief Justice McLachlin also cautioned that this interpretation did
not preclude treaty rights from evolving as a result of changes in the
economy or technology; however, she explained that any such evolution
must involve an evolved treaty-protected activity that is “essentially the
same”. “Logical evolution means the same sort of activity, carried on in
the modern economy by modern means. This prevents aboriginal rights
from being unfairly confined simply by changes in the economy and
technology. But the activity must be essentially the same”. Chief Justice
McLachlin affirmed that while treaty rights are capable of evolution
within limits, their subject matter cannot be wholly transformed.29
In conclusion, McLachlin C.J. held that the treaty does not protect
“the right to harvest and dispose of particular commodities”, but rather

24
25
26
27
28
29

Id., at para. 16.
Id., at para. 18.
Id., at para. 19.
Id., at para. 20.
Id., at paras. 21-24.
Id., at para. 25.
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protects only “the right to practice a traditional 1760 trading activity in
the modern way and modern context”.30
Chief Justice McLachlin found that the trial judges in both cases had
correctly identified this focus on trade as being the scope of the treaty
right, and based on the evidence had found that the Mi’kmaq people did
not engage in any traditional commercial logging activity at the time of
the treaty.31 She noted that while the evidence did disclose some
secondary, occasional and incidental trade in wood products, in items
such as baskets, snowshoes and canoes, there was no evidence of any
traditional trade in logs.32 As McLachlin C.J. stated: “Logging was not a
traditional Mi’kmaq activity. Rather, it was a European activity, in
which the Mi’kmaq began to participate only decades after the treaties
of 1760-61.”33 To the contrary, McLachlin C.J. noted that there was
evidence that logging was “inimical to the Mi’kmaq’s traditional way of
life, interfering with fishing”, which was a traditional activity.34 Further,
one of the Mi’kmaq witnesses had even conceded the unlikelihood that
the Mi’kmaq contemplated commercial logging during the treaty
process. There was similarly no evidence that the British ever
contemplated trade in anything but traditionally produced products, like
fur or fish.35 Chief Justice McLachlin therefore rejected the treaty claims
in both appeals.
Justice LeBel agreed with the majority’s conclusion that the treaty
did not protect commercial logging. However, LeBel J. placed a
different emphasis on the nature of the right, or rights, protected by the
treaty. Justice LeBel’s reasons emphasized that the treaty protected both
a right to trade and a right of access to resources for the purpose of
trade.
Justice LeBel’s reasons repeatedly emphasized that two separate
rights are protected, albeit two “closely intertwined” rights. He stated
that “the protected treaty right includes not only a right to trade but also
a corresponding right of access to resources for the purpose of
engaging in trading activities”.36 Elsewhere, LeBel J. noted that

30
31
32
33
34
35
36

Id., at para. 26.
Id., at paras. 27-34.
Id., at para. 33.
Id., at para. 34.
Id.
Id., at para. 33.
Id., at para. 110 (emphasis added).
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“although the treaty does protect traditional trading activities, the treaty
right comprises both a right to trade and a right of access to resources.
There is no right to trade in the abstract because a right to trade implies
a corresponding right of access to resources for trade”.37 He later
repeated the dual character of the rights (as compared to right): “The
treaty protects both a right to trade and a right of access to resources,
and these rights are closely intertwined”.38
Based on his “two rights” approach to the treaty, LeBel J.
articulated the test for treaty protection slightly differently from the
majority. Justice LeBel’s test asked whether “the resource and resourceextracting activity for which the respondents seek treaty protection must
reasonably have been in the contemplation of the parties”.39
However, based on the evidence in these cases, LeBel J. agreed with
the Chief Justice that logging was not in the contemplation of the parties
and was not the logical evolution of Mi’kmaq treaty rights.40
Consequently, in the result LeBel J. similarly rejected the treaty claims.

III. SOME ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS
FLOWING FROM MARSHALL; BERNARD
1. What Was Left Unsaid?
The relative brevity of the reasons in Marshall; Bernard belie their
complexity. Indeed, the reasons are as interesting and important for
what they omit as for what they contain.
For example, the Court’s reasons leave the impression that the
Crown had accepted Marshall 1 as binding authority. Indeed McLachlin
C.J. stated that the Crown “accepts Marshall 1 and 2, but argues that the
respondent misread them”. But this was not quite right. While the
Attorney General of New Brunswick (as well as the Attorneys General
of Canada, Ontario, Quebec, British Columbia, Alberta and
Newfoundland and Labrador) accepted Marshall 1 and 2 as good law,
the Attorney General of Nova Scotia emphatically did not. Nova Scotia
directed a substantial portion of its appellant’s factum to the argument

37
38
39
40

Id., at para. 112 (emphasis added).
Id., at para. 113 (emphasis added).
Id., at paras. 116-117.
Id., at para. 125.
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that the majority decision in Marshall 1 was per incuriam because the
significance of certain evidence tendered in that case had not been fully
appreciated by the Court.41 Nova Scotia’s position was that “there is no
right to hunt, fish and gather and trade for necessaries” under the 176061 treaties.42 For unstated reasons, the Court decided not to address this
argument.
The Court also decided not to address the content of the “moderate
livelihood” limit to the exercise of the treaty right emerging from
Marshall 1 and 2.43 For example, in the Bernard case the accused had
failed to establish, as part of his defence, that his logging was limited to
securing necessaries. The only evidence was that he had purchased a
tractor-trailer to participate in the “Native commercial wood harvest”,
and that he was caught hauling 23 spruce logs, his second load that day
alone. There was no other evidence as to whether his overall logging
activities were below the moderate livelihood limit, nor evidence as to
whether he was already earning a moderate livelihood through other
forms of traditional hunting, fishing and gathering for trade, which he
was now seeking to supplement through logging. Such a lack of
evidence effectively left the lower courts guessing the value of the logs
harvested and without any information about other potential sources of
income from the exercise of treaty rights.
Similarly, the Court declined to deal with issues such as whether the
accused were exercising their claimed communal treaty rights with
“community authority” (and how to prove such authority), as well as
other thorny issues such as the territories covered by the treaty and
possible extinguishment of the treaty rights through pre-Confederation
legislation.44
2. Does Marshall; Bernard Merely Clarify or Retrench from
Marshall 1?
Marshall; Bernard clarifies and maybe even retrenches somewhat from
the sweeping approach to treaty interpretation in Marshall 1, just as

41
42
43
44

Nova Scotia had not participated in Marshall 1.
Factum of the Attorney General of Nova Scotia, at paras. 87-122.
Supra, note 1, at para. 36.
Id.
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Marshall 2 had done so in respect of Marshall 1.45 Certainly, there were
those who (like McLachlin J. in Marshall 1) had highlighted the Trojanhorse approach to treaty interpretation endorsed by Binnie J. For
example, Professor Peter Hogg called Marshall 1 “a remarkable
example of the generous interpretation of an Indian treaty”.46 In his
view, “[i]t was a considerable stretch to interpret this clause, in form
nothing more than a negative restraint on the ability of the Mi’kmaq to
trade with non-governmental purchasers, as a protection of the
defendant’s commercial fishing activity.”47
Dean Patrick Monahan similarly warned that Marshall 1 could lead
to a very expansive approach to treaty interpretation going well beyond
the written treaty language, and indeed could relegate the written treaty
terms to merely “one more piece of evidence in clarifying the true
agreement of the parties”. As Dean Monahan explained:
The rule that a Treaty is defined by the terms of the written document
appears to have been qualified materially by the Supreme Court
decision in R. v. Marshall. […]
It is true, as Binnie J. pointed out in Marshall, that courts have in the
past been willing to interpret rights in a Treaty so as to make the
exercise of those rights effective and meaningful. What is novel about
the approach of the majority in Marshall, however, was the Court’s
willingness to imply a term into a Treaty to render effective a right
that was not part of the Treaty itself. Moreover, the approach in
Marshall invites litigants to argue that the “real Treaty” is the
understanding of the parties, as reflected in the context underlying the
negotiations, as opposed to the written Treaty document itself. On this
theory, the written document merely becomes one more piece of
evidence of the real agreement of the parties. This approach to treaty
interpretation goes significantly beyond previous cases, which had
focused on giving meaning and effect to the written language of the

45

See, for example, Bruce H. Wildsmith, Q.C., “Vindicating Mi’kmaq Rights: The
Struggle Before, During and After Marshall” (2001) 19 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 203, at 229,
235, who was counsel for the appellant in Marshall 1 and 2, and for the respondents in Marshall;
Bernard, who stated that Marshall 2 is “so inconsistent” with Marshall 1 that the Supreme Court
“cannot have appreciated the significance of what it was saying”, and that he “cannot help feeling a
sense of betrayal by the Supreme Court of the traditional image of justice as the lady in blindfold,
weighing the arguments and evidence before her”.
46
Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, vol. 1, loose-leaf ed. (Scarborough:
Carswell, 1992) section 27.6(d), at 27-32.
47
Id., at 27-33.

(2006), 34 S.C.L.R. (2d)

Treaty Interpretation

455

Treaty, and could have material implications for the interpretation of a
wide variety of treaties.48

At the end of the day, whether Marshall; Bernard is described as
merely clarifying Marshall 1 or retrenching from it probably involves
more semantics than substance. Clearly, this latest majority decision is
now the lens through which the earlier rulings must be viewed. But how
ironic it is that it would fall to McLachlin C.J. — the only remaining
justice from Marshall 1 — to explain the ambit of the earlier ruling
from which she had dissented.
3. How to Ascertain Common Intention?
If the bottom line of treaty interpretation is to ascertain the parties’
common intention at the time the treaty was made, then Marshall;
Bernard offers valuable guidance on how to prove that intention.
First, the ruling shows that direct evidence of intent may be
tendered through witnesses. Here, for example, the Court relied on
Chief Augustine’s testimony that, in his view, it was “unlikely” that the
Mi’kmaq contemplated commercial logging during the treaty process.49
Counsel should therefore take heed that they are not limited to arguing
common intent based on the entrails of the historical record.
Second, the ruling shows that Aboriginal oral history can be critical
evidence against a treaty claim. In this case, both McLachlin C.J.50 and
LeBel J.51 relied on the evidence of Chief Augustine to the effect that
Aboriginal oral history recorded that logging was inimical to the
Mi’kmaq’s traditional fishing way of life. The Court inferred from this
that logging cannot have been contemplated by the parties as having
been protected by the treaty. The Mi’kmaq’s oral history, as recounted
by Chief Augustine, contained stories of how
British people [were] coming in and cutting timber, cutting large big
trees and moving them down the river systems and clogging up the

48
Patrick Monahan, Constitutional Law, 2d ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2002), at 452-53,
454-55. See also Bradford W. Morse, “Aboriginal and Treaty Rights In Canada”, ch. 17 of GéraldA. Beaudoin & Errol Mendes, eds., Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 4th ed. (Markham,
ON: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2005), at 1171-1257, at 1209.
49
Id., at para. 33.
50
Id., at para. 34.
51
Id., at para. 122.
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rivers, I guess, with bark and remnants of debris from cutting up
lumber. And this didn’t allow the salmon to go up the rivers…52

The lesson is thus that Aboriginal oral history can cut both ways.
Third, the Court explicitly considered post-treaty conduct as
evidence of the parties’ intent at the time of the treaty. The Court noted
that the Mi’kmaq did not engage in logging until the 1780s, several
decades after the treaty was concluded, and that it “was only in the 19th
century that the Mi’kmaq began to harvest forest resources to trade in
forest products with the British”.53 Again, therefore, counsel can and
should look to the parties’ conduct after the claimed treaty right was
concluded.
Fourth, the Court’s decision shows more generally how critical it is
for an Aboriginal claimant to tender appropriate evidence to establish a
treaty claim. The ruling shows great sensitivity to the historical record
and evidences considerable reluctance to engage in abstract conjecture
outside that record. In this vein, it is noteworthy that the “ubiquitous
officious bystander”, who had figured so prominently in Marshall 1 as a
means of inferring a treaty right to fish, is totally out of sight in this
ruling. The message seems to be that in the future treaty rights will not
lightly be inferred absent a proper historical foundation.
4. How Far Can Treaty Rights “Logically Evolve”?
Another judicial concept that had figured prominently in Marshall 1 and
2, but which is much more tightly constrained in Marshall; Bernard, is
the concept of logical evolution of treaty rights.
In Marshall 2, the Court had said that “[w]hile treaty rights are
capable of evolution within limits […] their subject matter (absent a
new agreement) cannot be wholly transformed”.54 This language had
been debated extensively by the lower courts in Marshall and Bernard,
and formed the basis for the argument advanced by the Aboriginal
respondents and interveners that trade in some wood products at the
time of the treaty could “logically evolve” into a right to engage in
commercial logging.
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Id., cited in LeBel J.’s reasons.
Id., at para. 121.
Marshall 2, at para. 19.
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The Court in Marshall; Bernard has emphatically rejected this line
of reasoning. As McLachlin C.J. explained: “Logical evolution means
the same sort of activity, carried on in the modern economy by modern
means […] the activity must be essentially the same”.55 This approach
necessarily invites a qualitative comparison between the traditional
trade activity and the claimed modern, evolved treaty right. It poses the
question, is the activity essentially the same, or is it fundamentally
different? In this case, the Court accepted the lower court’s qualitative
comparison that “[c]ommercial logging does not bear the same relation
to the traditional limited use of forest products as fishing for eels today
bears to fishing for eels or any other species in 1760”.56 Effectively, the
Court found that commercial logging was a universe removed from
limited traditional wood use, and as such the former could not logically
evolve into the latter.
This narrower approach to the “logical evolution” of treaty rights is
entirely consistent with the Court’s prior decisions. The Court has
properly eschewed a “frozen-in-time approach to treaty rights”, and
ruled that treaty provisions must be interpreted “in a flexible way that is
sensitive to the evolution of changes in normal practice”.57 Thus, a treaty
right to fish for trade can evolve into the right to fish using an “outboard
motor”;58 a treaty right to hunt can evolve into a right to hunt with a
rifle;59 and a right to build shelter incidental to the right to hunt can
evolve into a right to build a log cabin for the purpose of hunting.60 The
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Marshall; Bernard, at para. 25 (emphasis added).
Id., at para. 32, citing the reasons of Curran Prov. Ct. J. in Marshall. See to similar
effect LeBel J.’s reasons, at para. 124:
Is the exploitation of timber resources a logical evolution of treaty rights? Given the cultural
and historical context in which the treaties were signed, to interpret the right of access to
resources for the purpose of engaging in traditional trading activities as a right to participate
in the wholesale exploitation of natural resources would alter the terms of the treaty and
wholly transform the rights it confirmed. Accordingly, trade in logs is not a right afforded to
the Mi’kmaq under any of the treaties of 1760-61 because logging represents a
fundamentally different use from that which would have been in the contemplation of the
parties.
57
Marshall 1, at para. 53, per Binnie J.
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Id.
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Simon v. The Queen, [1985] S.C.J. No. 67, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 387, at 402, per Dickson
C.J.
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R. v. Sundown, [1999] S.C.J. No. 13, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 393, at para. 32, per Cory J.
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question in each case is to determine “what modern practices are
reasonably incidental to the core treaty right in its modern context”.61
The purpose of rejecting the frozen-in-time approach is to give
meaning to the protection of “existing” Aboriginal and treaty rights
under section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. It allows section 35(1)
rights to be “affirmed in contemporary form rather than in their
primeval simplicity and vigour”.62 The Court’s decision in Marshall;
Bernard, while faithful to this approach, helpfully explains the limited
ambit of what will (and will not) constitute a logical evolution.
5. Is There Any Difference Between McLachlin C.J. and LeBel J.
on the Treaty?
As noted, LeBel J. felt the need to issue separate reasons concurring in
the result in Marshall; Bernard, which naturally raises the question of
whether LeBel J.’s reasons differ in substance from those of McLachlin
C.J. on the treaty issue, and if so, how?
In her treaty analysis, McLachlin C.J. placed the emphasis on what
was traded. She then found that the trade right carried with it “an
implicit right to harvest those resources”, which was merely the
“adjunct of the basic right to trade in traditional products”.63 Chief
Justice McLachlin’s analysis therefore proceeds on the basis of a single,
express treaty right to trade, accompanied by an implied right to harvest
resources for trade.
By contrast, LeBel J. did not appear to prioritize the rights in this
way. In his view, two separate rights are involved, albeit two “closely
intertwined” rights. In his view, the treaty protected both a right to trade
and a right of access to resources for the purpose of trade.
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Marshall 1, at para. 78, per McLachlin J., dissenting but not on this point (emphasis

added).
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R. v. Sparrow, [1990] S.C.J. No. 49, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075, at 1093, per Dickson C.J.
and La Forest J., affirmed in R. v. Sundown, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 393, at para. 32, per Cory J. for the
Court. The Court’s Aboriginal rights jurisprudence equally eschews frozen rights. Thus, as
Professor Hogg has explained, citing R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] S.C.J. No. 77, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507,
at para. 73, per Lamer C.J.: the “bone hook would be replaced by the steel hook”, and “the bow and
arrow by the gun”, but “a practice that has evolved into modern practices must trace its origins to
the pre-contact period. Contemporary practices that developed ‘solely as a response to European
influences do not qualify’”: P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1992)
looseleaf, vol. 1, at 27-20.
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Is there any practical difference between McLachlin C.J.’s “one
right” approach and LeBel J.’s “two rights” approach? It would seem
that such a difference could materialize only if one of LeBel J.’s closely
intertwined rights could somehow become unstuck from the other, such
that the right of access to resources could be exercised separate and
apart from whether the resource was ultimately traded. However, in
various places LeBel J. qualifies the right of access to resources as being
“for the purpose of engaging in trading activities”,64 and as a “right of
access to resources for trade”.65 This suggests that the access right is not
free-standing at all, but rather is superglued to the trade right.
However, LeBel J.’s approach arguably could lead to a different
approach to proving a treaty right. On his view, it would seem that
evidence would be needed for both the trade right and the access right,
whereas under McLachlin C.J.’s approach proof of the access right
would be unnecessary as that right would be inferred from proof of the
trade right.
Perhaps it is also conceivable that resources could be harvested for
the purpose of trade (and thus authorized by treaty) without actually
being traded. On this view, LeBel J.’s two rights approach could yield a
different result that McLachlin C.J.’s approach.
However, barring such unusual instances at the periphery, it would
seem that LeBel J.’s approach involves more of a difference in emphasis
than substance.
6. What Will Be the Impact for Future Resources?
There is little doubt that Marshall; Bernard will largely foreclose
attempts to extend this treaty to cover other resources such as minerals
and offshore natural gas deposits, which had been identified by
Aboriginal groups in Marshall 2 as being protected.66 Marshall;
Bernard refocuses the analysis on traditional trade activities. Aboriginal
peoples must now establish that a resource was a “traditionally traded
product” and show evidence of “trade in products [which] the Mi’kmaq
traded with the Europeans”. This is most unlikely to extend to minerals
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Id., at para. 110.
Id., at para. 112.
Marshall 2, at para. 19.
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and offshore natural gas deposits, although the determination of such
matters will of course ultimately depend on the historical evidence.
7. Should Treaty Rights Be Determined in Summary Conviction
Proceedings?
Lastly, LeBel J.’s reasons in Marshall; Bernard contain a very
interesting analysis of the appropriateness of determining treaty rights
and Aboriginal title claims in summary conviction proceedings.
By way of background, in Bernard one of the justices of the New
Brunswick Court of Appeal had pointed out the procedural unfairness in
using summary conviction proceedings to make findings on Aboriginal
title that could cloud the property rights of non-parties.67 In Bernard, the
claim for Aboriginal title covered from one quarter to one third of the
Province of New Brunswick, while in Marshall it extended to the entire
Province of Nova Scotia. The Aboriginal title claims also raised broader
issues, such as whether the Mi’kmaq were required to share the forest
resources with the present Crown licensees and whether Aboriginal title
was extinguished by the creation of reserves. Before the Supreme Court,
several of the parties and interveners echoed these concerns and urged
the Court to refrain from addressing the Aboriginal title issues in the
context of these summary conviction proceedings.
While McLachlin C.J.’s reasons did not refer to these arguments,68
they were picked up in LeBel J.’s concurring reasons. Interestingly,
LeBel J. concluded that it was time for the Court to “re-think the
appropriateness of litigating aboriginal treaty, rights and title issues in
the context of criminal trials”. As he explained:
The issues that are determined in the context of these cases have little
to do with the criminality of the accused’s conduct; rather, the claims
would properly be the subject of civil actions for declarations.
Procedural and evidentiary difficulties inherent in adjudicating
aboriginal claims arise not only out of the rules of evidence, the
interpretation of evidence and the impact of the relevant evidentiary

67
R. v. Bernard, [2003] N.B.J. No. 320, 230 D.L.R. (4th) 57, at 226, at para. 112 (C.A.),
per Robertson J.A.
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Although McLachlin C.J. clearly accepted that “[t]he significance of these cases
transcends the charges at stake. They were used as vehicles for determining whether Mi’kmaq
peoples in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick have the right to log on Crown lands for commercial
purposes pursuant to treaty or Aboriginal title” (supra, note 1, at para. 5).
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burdens, but also out of the scope of appellate review of the trial
judge’s findings of fact. These claims may also impact on the
competing rights and interests of a number of parties who may have a
right to be heard at all stages of the process. In addition, special
difficulties come up when dealing with broad title and treaty rights
claims that involve geographic areas extending beyond the specific
sites relating to the criminal charges.

Justice LeBel concluded that “there is little doubt that the legal
issues to be determined in the context of aboriginal rights claims are
much larger than the criminal charge itself and that the criminal process
is inadequate and inappropriate for dealing with such claims”. He
suggested that in future when Aboriginal rights issues arise in the
context of summary conviction proceedings, the Crown should consider
seeking a temporary stay of the charges to allow the Aboriginal claims
to be properly litigated in the civil courts. Once the claims are
adjudicated in civil courts, “the Crown could then decide whether to
proceed with the criminal charges”.69
There is considerable force to LeBel J.’s analysis that Aboriginal
title and treaty claims should be addressed only in a properly constituted
action for a declaration and not in a regulatory prosecution. It seems
only fair that private parties throughout the province should not have
their property rights thrown into limbo without knowing precisely the
claims alleged and having an opportunity to be heard.
To this end, the courts have traditionally found that Aboriginal title
claims require proper pleadings. In Delgamuukw v. British Columbia,
for example, it will be recalled that the Supreme Court ordered a new
trial after concluding that a pleadings defect (the title claim was framed
differently on appeal than at trial) prevented the Court from considering
the merits of the appeal.70 Similarly, other courts have traditionally
required title claims to be framed within properly constituted actions.71
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Supra, note 1, at paras. 142-44. This can be contrasted with the Court’s approach in
Marshall 2, at para. 13, which seemed to accept that the Crown was responsible for the procedural
posture of the case as a criminal proceeding: “Here the Crown elected to test the treaty issue by
way of a prosecution, which is governed by a different set of rules than is a reference or a
declaratory action. This appeal was directed solely to the issue whether the Crown had proven the
appellant guilty as charged.”
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[1997] S.C.J. No. 108, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, at paras. 76-7, per Lamer C.J.
71
See Western Forest Products Ltd. v. Skidegate Indian Band, [1985] B.C.J. No. 2994
(S.C.), per McKay J., refusing to allow the Haida to raise Aboriginal title in defence to an
injunction, insisting instead on “a properly constituted action” against the Crown (at para. 20).
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It is arguably no answer to these concerns to say that the Court is
stuck with the procedural posture of a regulatory case and that any
affected private parties should intervene at trial. The courts are
justifiably concerned about permitting interveners where liberty
interests are at stake,72 given the spectre of unfairness (“ganging up” on
the accused), delay in the proceedings and prejudice to the accused’s
right to a fair trial.73 As such, it seems only fair that such broad-ranging
Aboriginal title and treaty issues should be addressed only where all
interested parties have the right to be present and protect their interests.
Justice LeBel’s suggestion that the criminal proceedings be stayed
to allow for civil claims raises several practical issues, however.
Presumably a criminal proceeding could be stayed only with the
accused’s concurrence to become a civil plaintiff. A criminal defendant
may well agree to the staying of the criminal charges, but they must then
also agree to file a statement of claim and to move the civil proceedings
forward as plaintiff. This could substantially change the cost, strategy
and dynamics of Aboriginal litigation, and it is at least an open question
as to whether an Aboriginal accused would have any interest or
incentive in agreeing to such a proposal.
Nevertheless, for the moment LeBel J.’s interesting analysis of this
problem of litigation of Aboriginal issues in the criminal courts remains
a minority view. It is an open question as to whether his suggestion will
be adopted in future cases.

IV. CONCLUSION
While Marshall; Bernard raises many interesting questions, the decision
will not be the last word on Aboriginal logging rights in the Maritimes
or, perhaps, even elsewhere in Canada. On July 21, 2005, the day after
releasing Marshall; Bernard, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal
in R. v. Sappier and Polchies and R. v. Gray, two cases in which the
New Brunswick Court of Appeal (the same panel from R. v. Bernard no
less) had affirmed the existence of both Aboriginal and treaty rights of
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R. v. Seaboyer and Gayme, [1986] O.J. No. 128, 50 C.R. (3d) 395, at 398 (C.A.); R. v.
Finta, [1990] O.J. No. 2282, 1 O.R. (3d) 183, at 186 (C.A.).
73
R. v. O’Connor, [1993] B.C.J. No. 1466, 82 C.C.C. (3d) 495, at 501-502 (C.A.); R. v.
Ross, [1992] N.S.J. No. 405, 76 C.C.C. (3d) 536, at 541 (C.A.). Some have even said that it would
be improper to convict an Aboriginal accused based on arguments raised by interveners: see R. v.
Alfred, [1993] B.C.J. No. 2277, [1994] 3 C.N.L.R. 88, at 95-96 (S.C.).
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the Mi’kmaq and Maliseet Aboriginal peoples to engage in logging on
Crown lands for “personal use” (as opposed to trade).74 It remains to be
seen what the Court will make of these renewed logging claims.

74
R. v. Sappier and Polchies, [2004] S.C.C.A. 415; R. v. Gray, [2004] S.C.C.A. 416. The
Supreme Court heard oral argument on May 17 and 18, 2006 and reserved its rulings. The treaty
issue arose only in R. v. Sappier and Polchies, based on a 1725 treaty between the Maliseet and the
British Crown.

